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CONTRACT LAW: NEW MEDIA AND OLD LICENSES
It was not so long ago that few people had heard of video cassette
players for the home, let alone laser disc players.' With technology ex-
panding so rapidly the courts have had to decide whether new forms of
media, such as video cassettes and video discs, should be included under
license agreements that were created before these media were developed.
The court held in Platinum Record Co., Inc. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.2 that
where a license agreement can be fairly read to include exhibition by
means of newly developed or unforeseen media, it is the burden of the
licensor3 to negotiate exceptions to the rights granted to the licensee.4
The court also ruled that motion pictures are exhibited when shown to
an audience on a movie or television screen and therefore, video cassettes
and video discs are a means of exhibition rather than something unre-
lated to exhibition.5
In January 1973, Lucasfilm, Ltd. ("Lucasfilm"), entered into a li-
cense agreement with Chess Janus Records, the predecessor in interest of
Platinum Record Co.6 The license agreement gave Lucasfilm the right to
use the master recordings or matrixes7 of "Almost Grown," "Johnnie
[sic] B. Goode," "Book of Love" and "Goodnight Sweetheart" on the
soundtrack of the film "American Graffiti." 8
The disputed term of the agreement was contained in paragraph 2(f)
of the license agreement which stated:
(f) Subject to our performance of the terms and conditions
herein contained, you agree that we have the right to record,
dub and synchronize the above mentioned master recordings,
1. "Video cassettes" refers to the exhibition of a film on video tape played by a video
cassette player in an individual's home. "Video discs" refers to the exhibition of a film on
nylon laser discs by a laser disc player in an individual's home.
2. 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983).
3. For the purposes of this note, "licensor" includes assignor and grantor. "Licensee"
includes assignee and grantee.
4. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 228.
5. Id. at 228.
6. Id. at 226. (The defendants included Lucasfilm, Ltd.; Universal City Studios; and
MCA, Inc. Id.)
7. A matrix is an electroformed impression of a phonograph record used for mass-pro-
ducing duplicates of the original. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 703 (1981).
8. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227 n.1. The songs Lucasfilm obtained the
rights to, which were included in the "American Graffiti" soundtrack, were recorded by:
Chuck Berry, ("Almost Grown" and "Johnnie [sic] B. Goode"); the Monotones, ("Book of
Love"); and the Spaniels, ("Goodnight Sweetheart").
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
or portions thereof, into and with our motion picture and trail-
ers therefore, and to exhibit, distribute, exploit, market and per-
form said motion picture, its air, screen and television trailers,
perpetually throughout the world by any means or methods now
or hereafter known.' (Emphasis added.)
Lucasfilm produced "American Graffiti" under a contract with Uni-
versal City Studios."° A Universal subsidiary released the film for na-
tional theatrical exhibition in August 1973 and later released the film for
exhibition on cable, network and local television." "American Graffiti"
became a major commercial success.'" MCA Distributing Corp., a Uni-
versal affiliate, subsequently released the film for sale and rental to the
public on video cassettes and video discs. 13
Platinum Record never registered an objection to the exhibition of
"American Graffiti" on cable, network or local television."' Neverthe-
less, Platinum Record did object to the release of the film on video cas-
settes and video discs.15 Platinum Record argued that the terms of the
license agreement did not "speak for themselves" on the issue of whether
or not the right to show "American Graffiti" on video cassettes and video
discs had been granted.' 6 Platinum Record also contended that video
cassettes and video discs were not a form of exhibition and therefore were
not included in the license agreement.'"
Platinum Record brought suit for breach of contract, misappropria-
tion, unjust enrichment and tortious interference with business opportu-
nities. Lucasfilm moved for and was granted summary judgment.'"
In reaching a decision in the present case, the court relied entirely
on the language of the license agreement and a few extraneous acts by the
parties.' I9 The court believed that the license agreement could "fairly be
read" to include video cassettes and video discs.2"
As such, paragraph 2(f) of the license agreement gave Lucasfilm the
right to "exhibit, . . . exploit, market and perform "American Graffiti"
.perpetually throughout the world by any means or methods now or
9. Platinum Record Co., 556 F. Supp. at 277.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 226.
13. Id. at 227.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 226.
19. Id. at 227-28.
20. Id. at 227.
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hereafter known."'" The court found this language to be extremely
broad and unambiguous 22 and thus could reasonably be construed to pre-
clude the need for an exhaustive or specific list of ways in which the film
could be exploited or exhibited.2" The court stated that the burden of
creating exceptions to the broad language of the license agreement
should fall upon the licensor.24
The court relied heavily on Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer25 in
reaching its decision. The appellate court in Bartsch employed a "rea-
sonable interpretation rationale"26 in ruling that where the intent of the
original contracting parties cannot be discerned, the assignment of mo-
tion picture rights will include the right to exhibit the film on television.27
The Platinum Record court cited Bartsch which stated, "[i]f the words
are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden of
framing and negotiating an exception should fall on the grantor.
28
Both the Bartsch and Platinum Record courts reasoned that if the
licensor of rights wished to limit the type of exhibition of a film to the
conventional method of carrying light from a projector to a theater
screen in front of an audience, they could have simply so stated in the
license agreement.29 In the present case, the court noted that Platinum
Record never raised an objection when "American Graffiti" was shown
on cable, network and local television.3" The court believed that the fail-
ure to object indicated that there was no intent that the film be limited to
exhibition on theater screens.3 '
The court then addressed Platinum Record's contention that the li-
censor could not have foreseen the development of video cassettes and
video discs and therefore could not have intended that the license agree-
ment include these new forms of media.3 2 The court relied on the district
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968)).
The Bartsch court used the "reasonable interpretation approach" and held that a grant by a
copyright owner of a musical play to a motion picture company of the right to copyright, vend,
license and exhibit the motion picture throughout the world included the right to televise the
film. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
24. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
25. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 150.
26. See explanation of the reasonable interpretation approach in text infra.
27. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
28. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 228.
32. Id. at 229.
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court finding in Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries33 that " '[w]here,
. . . a party has acquired a contractual right which may be fairly read as
extending to media developed thereafter,' the other party can hardly
avoid the contract's application to such media by establishing that the
precise nature of the advance was not anticipated."34 The Rooney court
reasoned that new media were included in the license agreements since
the contracts in question ensured that the rights granted would not be
limited to exclude the unforeseen advances in media by drafting broad
terms.35
The Lucasfilm agreement contained a similar broad term which
stated that Lucasfilm could "exhibit, . . . exploit and market ...
"American Graffiti" by any means or methods now or hereafter
known."3 6 The Platinum Record court construed this language reason-
ably to include exhibition by media developed in the future whether or
not they were foreseen at the time the license agreement was created.37
Since the language of the license agreement was broad enough to include
the new media, the court did not require specific mention of video cas-
settes or video discs.38 Since there was no mistake as to the terms of the
license, the issue of whether or not the licensor intended to grant the
rights to video cassettes and video discs was irrelevant.39
Finally, Platinum Record contended that "exhibition of the film," as
covered by the agreement, did not include the showing of the film on
video cassette or video disc.' The court noted that Platinum Record did
not offer a definition of what "exhibition of the film" included.41 The
court determined that since Platinum Record had not objected to the
showing of "American Graffiti" on either cable, network or local televi-
sion, these types of media were included under "exhibition."42 Since
these types of media were included, the court determined that it was just
as reasonable to include video cassettes and video discs under "exhibition
of the film."43 The court adopted the rationale of the Rooney court that
33. 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
34. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 229.
35. Id. at 228. (Examples of broadly drafted terms include "by any means," "by other
improvements and devices which are now or may hereafter be used," and "by any present or
future method or means." Id. at 229.)
36. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
37. Id. at 228.
38. Id. at 227.
39. Id. at 228.
40. Id. at 227.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 227.
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"whether the exhibition apparatus is a home video cassette player or a
television station's broadcast transmitter, the films are 'exhibited' as
images on home television screens."" The court then stated that "a mo-
tion picture is exhibited when it is presented for viewing by an audience
on a theater or television screen; the video cassette and the video disc
operate as a means of exhibition, not as something of an altogether differ-
ent nature from exhibition.""
The Platinum Record case has reinforced the use of the reasonable
interpretation approach for handling license agreement disputes. How-
ever, this is not the only approach. Where the intent of the parties can be
reasonably ascertained from the language of the license agreement and
extraneous evidence, a traditional contract interpretation approach may
be used.46 In other situations, when the intent of the parties cannot be
reasonably ascertained, the court may construe the license agreement by
strict interpretation.47
The traditional interpretation approach involves examining the lan-
guage of the license agreement and any allowable extraneous evidence in
order to determine whether the parties intended that new forms of media
would be included in the grant of rights.48 This seems to be the position
that Platinum Record advocated in its case.49 This approach works well
in situations where the licensor grants all the possible rights or allows for
specific exceptions in the agreement. However, a license agreement often
is ambiguous about what was granted. An interpretation problem may
arise by inferring a licensor's intent regarding a type of medium that was
not developed at the time the license agreement was created.5"
The ambiguity of language may also contribute to other problems as
well. In the present case, the language of the license agreement allows
Lucasfilm to "exhibit . . . said motion picture . . . by any means or
44. Id. (citing Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 228.)
45. Id. at 228.
46. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.10 (B), at 10-85 (1985).
47. Id.
48. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd in
part, 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970). (The Goodis court, using the traditional interpretation ap-
proach, examined the language of the license agreement and extraneous evidence in finding
that the plaintiff had granted the television rights to "Dark Passage" which later became the
television series "The Fugitive.")
49. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
50. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
affd mem., 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978). (The district court, using the traditional interpreta-
tion method, held that an express provision reserving television rights was not limited to live
dramatic productions used by the licensee. This prohibited the licensee from making any use
of television as a method of exploitation of the "Hopalong Cassidy" stories.)
1986]
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methods now or hereafter known."51 Under the traditional approach
there may have been a question as to whether the licensor's intent was to
restrict exhibition to a theater screen by any means known now or later,
or to allow exhibition by any type of media utilized now or in the future.
The Platinum Record license agreement could have been interpreted as a
grant of all rights, including video cassettes and video discs, or it could
have been construed as restricting the rights to motion pictures shown in
theaters since new forms of media were not expressly mentioned in the
license agreement. To resolve this conflict the court would have had to
consider extraneous evidence in order to clarify the licensor's intent.52
Since Platinum Record did not object to the showing of "American
Graffiti" on cable, network or local television,53 the court could reason-
ably have concluded that the license agreement included types of media
other than showing the film in a theater. Video cassette players were
available as early as 1971," and therefore the licensor should have been
aware of the growing medium of video cassettes and video discs in 1973,
when the license agreement was created. Since Platinum Record did not
object to exhibition of the film on television, which was not expressly
granted in the license agreement, it would have been reasonable for the
court to apply the same rationale to video cassettes and video discs, thus
construing them to be included under the broad license term. Under the
traditional interpretation approach, when the language of the license
agreement is ambiguous, the subsequent acts of the parties and the
knowledge that the parties should have possessed is considered.55 Thus,
it would have been reasonable for the Platinum Record court to hold that
video cassettes and video discs were included in the grant of rights. Nev-
ertheless, depending on extraneous evidence for the interpretation of a
license agreement could lead courts to make inconsistent decisions re-
garding the same language.
If the evidence does not provide a reasonable and satisfactory inter-
pretation of the licensor's intent then the court may turn to the strict
interpretation approach or the reasonable interpretation approach.
These approaches look beyond the parties' possible intentions in order to
clarify the meaning of the license agreement by whatever factors the
court believes to be determinative. Both the strict and reasonable inter-
51. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
52. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.10 (B), at 10-86 (1985).
53. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
54. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music, 58 (1979).
55. Goodis, 278 F. Supp. 122, rev'd in part, 425 F.2d 397.
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pretation approaches generally focus on the language of the license
agreement.
The modern trend, however, is to move away from strict interpreta-
tion.56 In the strict interpretation approach a license agreement for any
medium would be restricted to those uses that would fall within the un-
ambiguous meaning of the terms of the agreement.57 While attractive on
its face, the strict interpretation approach does have its problems. First,
the terms of a license agreement may not always speak for themselves.
Thus, the court may find itself confronted with a license agreement that
does not lend itself to easy interpretation. Second, when a license agree-
ment contains a broad term, there is a chance that each party may attach
a different meaning to the agreement. This could lead a licensee to be-
lieve that rights to video cassettes and video discs were granted when the
licensor had no such intention. The result is a burden imposed on the
licensee to make the terms of the license agreement as specific as possible.
This is the case even where a term might have been understood to in-
clude the rights to a new medium, since the court would be likely to
reserve to the licensor any rights not expressly granted." The licensee
could face an overwhelming burden in drafting a specific term that could
cover new types of media that may not be anticipated by either party.
With technology racing ahead at light speed it seems likely that a term
allowing the use of some new unforeseen medium would end up in the
court room where a decision would have to be reached as to whether the
new technology was intended to fall under the terms covering new
media.
Given the facts in the Platinum Record case, a court using the strict
interpretation approach might have ruled that video cassette and video
disc rights were not included under the license agreement. This interpre-
tation could occur because the technology for these media was available
at the time the rights were granted, yet the rights to these types of media
were not expressly granted in the agreement. This would have placed the
burden on Lucasfilm to specifically ask for and include in the license
agreement the rights to video cassettes and video discs. In Platinum Rec-
ord, the strict interpretation approach would not have provided a clear
answer as to what rights were included in the license agreement.
The Platinum Record court selected the reasonable interpretation
approach as the appropriate alternative in this situation." This ap-
56. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d 155; Rooney, 538 F. Supp. 211.
57. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d 155.
58. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
59. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
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proach permits a licensee to pursue any uses of the copyrighted material
that may reasonably be construed to fall within the medium described in
the license agreement.'
However, the reasonable interpretation approach has its problems,
too. A reasonable interpretation of a broad license term could result in
the grant of rights in the new media since the license agreement did not
expressly exclude them.6' A license agreement that is held reasonably to
include the use of new unforeseen media could result in a windfall for the
licensee. Here, the burden of making the terms of the license agreement
specific is placed on the licensor. Should the licensor neglect to make the
terms of the license agreement specific as to the rights granted or ex-
cepted, then a risk will be run by the licensor of losing the profits from
the exploitation of some new media form. Placing the burden on the
licensor assumes that the licensor knows or should know about any am-
biguous terms in the license agreement as well as any new types of media.
Nevertheless, licensors may have difficulty making a license agreement
specific as to certain types of media, especially when they do not possess
any knowledge about media advances.62
A further problem with the reasonable interpretation approach is
the difficulty of resolving terms that do not lend themselves to interpreta-
tion through the language of the license agreement and extraneous evi-
dence. Thus, by using a reasonable interpretation approach, ambiguous
terms may lead to arbitrary decisions by the court.
In applying the reasonable interpretation approach to the Platinum
Record case, however, it was reasonable for the court to find that the
broad grant of rights in paragraph 2(f) of the license agreement included
new media. Chess Janus Records should have known about video cas-
sette technology since it had been available for the home since 1971.63
Had Chess Janus Records not wished to include a grant of video cassette
and video disc rights they should and could have expressly excepted
them in the license agreement.
The court has followed the modern trend of applying the reasonable
interpretation approach.' The court found the language of the license
agreement to be broad and unambiguous and therefore did not require a
specific list of the included media.6' The decision placed the burden on
60. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.10 (B), at 10-86 (1985).
61. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 85, 188 N.E. 163, 166
(1938). (A licensor should not be held to grant rights that could not have been foreseen.)
62. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
63. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, 58 (1979).
64. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. 227.
65. Id.
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the licensor to expressly exempt video cassettes and video discs from the
broad language of the license agreement if there was no intent that they
be granted.
66
The courts may be favoring the reasonable interpretation approach
due to a policy consideration raised in Bartsch .67 The Bartsch court fa-
vored the reasonable interpretation approach because "it provides a sin-
gle person who can make the copyrighted work available to the public
over the penumbral medium."'68 The Bartsch court added that the strict
interpretation approach would involve a risk of a deadlock between the
parties that could prevent the film from ever being shown over the vari-
ous new types of media.69 Thus, this policy argument awards a windfall
to the licensee and benefits the viewing public at the expense of the licen-
sor who is punished for not drafting a specific license agreement.
On the other hand, the reasonable interpretation approach would
still seem to be preferable since it allows the court to be flexible in its
decisions and insures that the film will be made available over a variety of
new media. Courts in the future will probably follow this approach and
include any rights to new media that may reasonably be read into the
terms of the license agreement.
Licensors should take note that the burden is on them to expressly
include any exceptions that they may have intended in the license agree-
ment. Should the licensor fail to expressly include any exceptions or lim-
itations, the court will grant the rights to new unforeseen media to the
licensee as long as the license agreement can fairly be read to include
them. The licensor must beware because the court may use a broad li-
cense term to grant sweeping rights to the licensee when neither party
ever intended that they be included.
Richard Alan Martin
66. Id.
67. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 150.
68. Id. at 155.
69. Id.
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